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Introduction
1 
In October 2004 Peter Mandelson was appointed as the new European Union (EU) external trade 
Commissioner. He embodies one of the EU’s strongest roles in international affairs, trade power. 
Given its global trading power, and the world’s largest market – more than 450 million people, 
Europe’s trading policy is an important instrument for shaping both domestic and international politics 
(4 October 2004) 
2. The main task of the external trade Commissioner consists in negotiating bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
other multilateral institutional rules on behalf of Europe’s 25 member states. Such policies are 
extensive both in terms of the geographical area and the range of sectors that they affect. Their official 
aim is to secure prosperity, solidarity and security in Europe and around the globe, as well as to ensure 
that the European business can operate fairly in Europe and worldwide.  
Mandelson came into office at a turning point in the history of global economy. As he argues, the 
emergence of new economic actors such as China, India, and Brazil is significantly changing the 
world economic order. While he perceives the economic growth and size of exports of these countries 
as both a menace to the protectionist European market, he also sees these countries as key WTO 
members whose cooperation is needed in order to pass new international trade agreements which are 
vital for Europe’s economy. How should Europe interact with these countries?  Does he perceive them 
as Europe’s partners or as threats? More broadly, how does Mr Mandelson employ the European 
international trade policies in order to defend and promote the EU’s interests as these are challenged 
by the globalisation process? These and other questions will be answered in this paper in order to 
investigate Peter Mandelson’s worldview about the nature of international relations and the role of the 
EU as an international actor.  
The paper will be subdivided into three parts. The first section presents a biography of Mr 
Mandelson and outlines the way in which he presents his earlier experiences to construct his image as 
European Commissioner. The second section uses Alexander George’s philosophical and instrumental 
questions to identify and analyse Peter Mandelson’s perceptions of international relations and politics 
(George, 1969; Vennesson, 2007). I will focus on one aspect of Mandelson’s ideas, those related to the 
WTO and Doha agenda. Such a targeted operational code analysis, i.e. focused on a particular topic, 
provides a specific understanding of the policymaker’s ideas (Young and Schafer, 1998: 71). Finally, 
the third section will conclude this article by presenting Mr Mandelson’s general perception about the 
EU’s self-image and role as an international actor. The primary sources of this paper are the speeches 
and articles that Peter Mandelson has given while appointed as European Commissioner of Trade.
3 As 
a result, the worldviews that this investigation describes represent that of the role that Mandelson plays 
– i.e. European Commissioner of Trade.  
                                                      
1   This paper is one of a collection of six related RSCAS working papers (EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/07 to EUI-WP RSCAS 
2007/12, inclusive). Earlier versions of these papers were presented at the workshop ‘European Worldviews: Ideas and 
the European Union in World Politics’, European University Institute-Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, 6 
June 2006. For an overall presentation of the research project, see Pascal Vennesson, Introduction to ‘European 
Worldviews: Ideas and the EU in World Politics’, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 07_07.   
2    Peter Mandelson’s speeches are listed in the bibliography.  
3    This investigation is mainly built on the content of Mr Mandelson’s interviews and speeches, since October 2004, 
downloaded from the Directorate General of External Trade web page last visited 4 May 2006: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_index_en.htm> Fiorella Triscritti 
2  EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/11 © 2007 Fiorella Triscritti 
Peter Mandelson’s Biography: The Construction of an Image 
Mr Mandelson, born 21 October 1953, was a UK official before becoming the current Commissioner 
of the European Union External Trade Directorate General (DG Trade). As a member of the Labour 
party, he served as representative of the Hartlepool constituency for twelve years (1992-2004). In 
addition, he is widely regarded, together with Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Alastair Campbell, as 
one of the main architects of the modern Labour party and its re-branding as ‘new Labour’.  
Grandson of Labour cabinet minister Herbert Morrison, Mr Mandelson rebelled against his 
family’s traditional links with Labour. In 1971, he joined the Young Communist League after the 
Labour Party supported the United States’ intervention in Vietnam. This far-left experience ended 
when he entered St. Catherine’s College, Oxford, where he studied philosophy, politics, and 
economics (1973-1976). Before entering Oxford, he spent a ‘gap year’ in Tanzania, an experience that 
he presents as shaping his understanding of Africa and the challenge of fighting poverty. A 
longstanding pro-European, in 1979, he led the British delegation to the first meeting of the European 
Communities Youth Forum in Strasbourg. In 1985, he became the Labour party director for campaign 
and communications, and he left the job only in 1990, when he was selected as Labour candidate for 
the seat of Hartlepool. In 1992, Mr Mandelson was elected as MP for Hartlepool. From 1994 on, he 
became a close ally and trusted adviser of Mr Blair, joining Blair’s cabinet as Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry in 1998. A few months later he was forced to resign due to a financial scandal. He 
was appointed shortly thereafter Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, but in January 2001 he was 
forced to resign a second time over an allegation of misconduct. Later on, inquires cleared him of any 
wrongdoing. During the 2001 general election, he was re-elected and he remained in charge as MP for 
Hartlepool until being nominated as European Commissioner in 2004.  
From Mr Mandelson’s speeches it is possible to single out two periods of his life, both of which he 
uses to construct his image as Commissioner. First, his young years as a leftist activist, when he 
became concerned about issues regarding developing countries. Second, since 1985, his years as a UK 
official and, in particular, as Hartlepool’s MP. Mr Mandelson’s first stage was, then, characterised by 
his sojourn in Tanzania. While in Africa, he worked under the aegis of Bishop Trevor Huddleston, the 
‘leftist’ anti-apartheid campaigner, who Mandelson claims to be one of the most inspiring people of 
his life (6 July 2005). While there, he worked on a farm, in a hospital, and a primary school. In his 
view, this experience revealed his moral commitments to ‘Make Poverty History’, by trying to ‘get 
things done’ (4 February 2005). This is why he refers to this period in his lifetime as the one that made 
him understand the effect that poverty had on less developed countries, and how Europe should and 
could help them. Since then, having learned at first-hand that there is no simple panacea for 
development, he has taken forward the view that the EU should use all the policy tools it has at its 
disposal to fight poverty, among which also trade (1 December 2004). Mr Mandelson argues that, 
together, European trade and development policies can fight poverty. As a result, since being in office, 
he has worked closely with Louis Michel, the EU Commissioner for development: his position is that 
their mission is to increase the capacity of poorer countries both to participate in international 
negotiations and to benefit from more open and fair rules for trade.  
Just as Mandelson’s younger years as a political activist are constantly referred to in his speeches, 
by the same token, his years as a British official are virtually anonymous. This may of course be due 
to the fact that, having suffered from private and financial scandals over that period, it may be neither 
pleasant to recall nor advantageous in terms of his credibility as Commissioner. Still, he does mention 
one - his position as representative of the constituency of Hartlepool (4 October 2004). During this 
period (1992-2004), he claims to have represented and assisted his constituents in coping with the 
economic changes of the period. In 1992, when he took office, this traditional Labour constituency 
was going through a period of poverty and high unemployment due to the closure of the town’s major 
industry, the steel works. At that time, the unemployment rate was over 20%. By the end of his 
mandate, in 2004, the unemployment rate had fallen to less than 5%. Overall, he was re-elected twice, 
in 1997 and 2001, with a 60% majority, which shows that its constituents judged him as accountable Free Trade and New Economic Powers: The Worldview of Peter Mandelson 
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and representative over time. Moreover, he argues that this experience taught him that people are part 
of economic change, and that their lives are conditioned by it.  
Hence, through his speeches, Mr Mandelson constructs an image of himself that gives him ethical 
qualities and makes him a capable official in dealing with global challenges. Ethical, thought his care 
about worldwide issues such as poverty. Capable, since he claims to have handled the Hartlepool’s 
economic recession well. However, the next section will show that this self-image remains distant 
from his policy choices and worldviews as European Commissioner. 
International Relations: Peter Mandelson’s Views  
Among Mandelson’s many missions as European Commissioner, he claims that one of the most 
important is to ensure a safer and prosperous world while defending European interests, thanks to 
multilateral trade agreements. Multilateralism is one of his core values. Although he does not refer 
explicitly to any academic concept of multilateralism, his approach seems to follow Kehoane’s 
concept of ‘diffuse reciprocity’ in international relations (Keohane, 1986). Mr Mandelson argues that 
the characteristic of a multilateral negotiation is that all partners will gain benefits from it (8 December 
2005). It is thus not a zero sum game, but multiplies the benefits of what a country does internationally 
beyond what it can achieve bilaterally, or alone, by establishing a higher number of win-win solutions 
(23 January 2006). These international negotiations are run by multilateral organisations. He describes 
them as an open space for negotiations, where equal rights and duties should be guaranteed to all 
members, in order to ensure balanced and legitimate decisions. If this is the case, Mr Mandelson 
argues, multilateralism can play a key role in modern international politics by finding solutions to 
common global challenges such as poverty and sustainable development (23 November 2005). In his 
view, only multilateral decision making can provide efficient solutions to world challenges since ‘the 
time when two big powers where making decisions is over’ (24 November 2004). As a result, he 
claims, the future of international relations relies on multilateralism. 
These multilateral institutions promote an approach to trade policies which follows the economic 
liberalism philosophy. The multilateral trade agreements made come under the umbrella of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), which is a complex multilateral system of rules and norms aimed at 
reducing trade barriers among countries on a coordinated and multilateral basis (Ray, 1998: 711). 
Although Mandelson does not refer to any specific literature on tariff reduction,  his ideas seem to 
support free trade as the best policy for the international trade system. Given Mandelson’s set of core 
values - multilateralism and economic liberalism, what are his philosophical and instrumental beliefs 
about the international relations? 
Actors, Relations and Power Politics  
Mr Mandelson describes international political life as a web of linkages across trade, finance and 
resources with which states are increasingly caught up. He embraces Keohane and Nye’s concept of 
interdependence theory, suggesting that economic interdependence, resulting from globalisation, will 
lead regimes to be formed which will increase the probability of coordination among states and avoid 
conflicts (Keohane and Nye, 1977). These multilateral negotiations are carried out between partners 
who primarily promote and defend their self-interests. He claims that each partner, including himself, 
engages in negotiations following a self-interested approach. This means that the amount of 
cooperation that can be achieved among partners is determined by states and state interests and 
strategies by which they interact with others (Caporaso, 1993: 56). Hence, negotiations are driven by 
power politics.  
According to Mr Mandelson, the international trade arena is composed of three typologies of 
actors: (i) leading actors; (ii) developing countries; and, (iii) poorest countries. The leading actors are 
the EU and the United States (US). Their role is to secure open and fair trade, respecting the Fiorella Triscritti 
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transparency and fairness of the WTO decision-making process. This, he believes, is a transatlantic 
priority, and he considers this partnership as one of the most important for the world’s prosperity and 
security (4 October 2004). Firstly, because trade between Europe and America stands at $1 billion per 
day, and together they produce over half the world’s output (Mandelson, 2000: 14). Secondly, because 
EU and US decisions have a wide global impact (Mandelson, 2000: 15). Although he is aware that 
international events and challenges, notably the Iraqi crisis, have revealed the possibility of different 
approaches, he claims that Europeans and Americans still share the same beliefs in democracy and 
individual freedom. Furthermore, he believes that they need to find ways to address the same shared 
human problems - poverty, migration, climate change, resource crises, and the same global challenges 
to security. This is why he considers this leading relation as critically important to Europe, the United 
States, as well as the rest of the world.  
Thus Mr Mandelson’s relations with the US are rather different from those of his predecessor, 
Pascal Lamy. According to Van Den Hoven, Lamy’s discourse within the context of the WTO 
negotiations was characterised by absence of competition with the US over leadership in the WTO. 
While in the Uruguay Round (1995),
 the US isolated the EU by building up a coalition of countries 
against the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), during the Doha Round Lamy mobilised developing 
country WTO members against American unilateral protectionism in steel (Van Den Hoven, 2004: 
264). Lamy also tried to isolate the US during the Doha negotiations by promoting initiatives which 
would strengthen the EU’s moral ground in the WTO (Lamy, 2001): he wanted to increase the EU’s 
credibility with the developing countries in order to gain their support during WTO negotiations. 
Instead, in Mandelson’s discourse, this confrontation between the EU and the US for the support of 
developing countries is absent. He refers to the US as a vital ally, with whom the WTO’s leadership 
must be equally shared. Mandelson believes that United States cooperation during the WTO Doha 
Round is fundamentally important to Europe.  
Illustrating this positive attitude, for instance, is the fact that Mr Mandelson has been in close 
contact with Rob Portman, the US Trade Representative. The tone Mr Mandelson uses in his dialogues 
with Mr Portman has been publicly presented as friendly and candid, emphasising the importance of 
finding an agreement on agricultural policies. He does not focus on what specific issues they disagree, 
nor has he suggested any real possible solutions to reach a common EU-US agreement on these 
policies. Viewed in these terms, these dialogues give only a superficial view of Mr Mandelson’s 
opinions of US trade policies. A better understanding can instead be found in other speeches. Looking 
at these other sources, it turns out that Mr Mandelson has some critical views on US trade policy. For 
instance, he argues that the transatlantic relationship lacks energy and coordination, and criticises the 
last US farm bill, which increased agricultural subsidies. Still, given that he claims that ‘neither of us 
[Europeans and Americans] has a partner in the world anywhere near as close or as important as the 
other’ (11 February 2005), his approach is to look at these divergences in a constructive spirit, seeking 
positive outcomes while defending the EU’s interests and rights.  
The second category of actors is represented by the developing countries. Mr Mandelson defines 
them as competitive country exporters, whose interests tend to differ from those of the leading 
countries (21 March 2006). Some of these major economic players and exporters are Argentina, 
Brazil, China and India, and due to their international trade competitiveness, they are portrayed as a 
possible threat to the leading actors’ interests. In order to deal with this, Mr Mandelson’s strategic 
policy is to base the negotiations between the leading actors and the developing actors on full 
reciprocity. An example of his policy is his position with respect to tariff cuts negotiations. In his 
view, the only viable basis of negotiations is ‘real cuts for real cuts’ (21 April 2006). Although he 
accepts that developing countries may find this policy difficult, and he is aware that it needs to be 
applied proportionally, the principle of less than full reciprocity does not mean any reciprocity at all to 
him. In his view, the advanced developing countries should take their share of responsibility in 
negotiations (Mandelson, 21 April 2006).  Free Trade and New Economic Powers: The Worldview of Peter Mandelson 
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The tone Mr Mandelson uses when referring to developing countries is tough and presiding. For 
instance, his offer for better prospects of agricultural trade for efficient Latin American producers is 
based on the condition that, in return, Latin Americans will open up their markets in those areas where 
the EU seeks new access: industrial goods and services. He was quite clear about this: ‘…let me be 
crystal clear, there will be no deal on agriculture [if you do not open the service market]. It is simply 
not deliverable.’ (Speech, 13 October 2005). Therefore we can see that he not only imposes the 
conditions but also the policies that Latin Americans must pursue in order to negotiate with the EU.  
Among the developing countries, a special attention is directed towards China. In his view, 
‘China’s future matters for all of us’ (9 December 2004). After China joined the WTO, he defined it as 
‘the biggest single challenge of globalisation in the trade field’ (Speech, 4 May 2006). Therefore, he 
argues that ‘Europe must get China right, as a threat, an opportunity and prospective partner’ (4 May 
2006). Although some may see China’s size as a threat, Mr Mandelson believes that it is not likely to 
become an expansionist power. In his view, the likelihood that China will become a threat to Europe 
depends above all on how Europe presents itself to China. Accordingly, he aims to reinforce the links 
with China by developing a ‘strategic partnership’ based on the establishment of mutually agreed and 
enduring conditions, whose aim is to protect both the EU and China from mutual uncertainties such as 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, poverty, migration and 
international crime, epidemics, the shortage of resources and the threat of climate change. In addition, 
he briefly mentions that the EU’s concern over the protection of human rights is a key point and that 
‘…we should vigorously pursue our dialogue on this, based on mutual respect, confidence, and a wish 
to improve ourselves’ (24 February 2005).  
The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries constitute the poorest countries group. These 
countries are experiencing a low level of economic development and are not well integrated into the 
international trade system. Accordingly, Mr Mandelson believes that the EU should give them all the 
help they need by receiving tailored assistance (23 January 2006). His attitude towards these countries 
is less aggressive than with the developing ones, but still presents the European Union as a strong 
international actor, willing to make a limited number of compromises only. For instance, in his 
speeches he shows to be concerned about their fate, but he does not hesitate to patronise them against 
any decision that could hinder Europe’s interests, although this may favour the developing countries 
one. Thus, Mr Mandelson’s apparently altruistic attitude is, first and foremost, conditional on the 
protection of Europe’s interests.  
A second important point to mention is that in his speeches, Mandelson does not mention what 
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relations by the amount of influence an actor has over the international economic system. His concept 
of power thus follows a politically realistic perspective since the political economic order follows from 
the concentration of political-economic power that a country has (Ashley, 1984: 232): the smaller a 
country’s economy, the weaker its position in international relations, since its influence over other 
countries’ economies is weak. This definition of power is very similar to Waltz’s understanding of 
power as the capacity to influence, i.e. to ‘have power’, over other states. As Waltz equated power 
with control, since ‘an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him’ 
(Waltz, 1979), so Mandelson believes that the more a state is capable of influencing the international 
trade system, the more it is powerful. Thus Mandelson’s concept of power is measured by the capacity 
of a country to shape the structures of the international political economy. Accordingly, he defines 
China, India and Brazil as important economic powers (4 October 2004).  
Moving on, negotiations among the different typologies of actors take place according to the 
contractual space provided by the WTO multilateral trade rules. Thus, the framework of the WTO 
international relations significantly conditions these relations. In particular, since reaching a new trade 
agreement requires the consensus of all members, neither the leading players nor the developing 
countries are able to lead or impose a new trade agenda alone. Given this rule, Mandelson regards the 
WTO as a powerful democratic international organisation for all its 149 members. This, for instance, 
is why he believes that the WTO can guarantee protection and benefits from the global economy to the 
poorest countries (23 November 2004). Still, given that negotiations are driven by power politics, the 
WTO consensus can also be imposed to some extent by the most powerful states, i.e. the developed 
countries. Thus, consensus can also be the result of coercion and a self-maximising strategy by the 
leading actors.  
Without consensus, that is, agreements remain un-enforced and the international community is 
blocked, unable to take any decisions. It therefore is a given that the absence of consensus is a menace 
to this international system. Fearful of this, Mr Mandelson has therefore exhorted the EU’s negotiating 
partners to enter into real negotiations with the EU on all issues. The alternative, in his view, is to risk 
achieving ambitious results from the Doha Round. In a speech to the press he stated that ‘Negotiation 
is the only way you [developing countries] can achieve your goals - and we [the EU] ours’ (9 
November 2005).  
To conclude, Mr Mandelson’s worldview is characterised by a set of complicated strategic plans 
aimed at defending Europe’s interests. He believes that all national and international policies are the 
result of whether their leaders’ policies endorse their country’s interests. Thus, he does not accept that 
international events can be shaped by ‘chance’. In his opinion, chance means the opportunity that is 
given to each country, during the multilateral negotiations, to forward their own and shared interests 
and to reach an agreement in order to boost trade, development, thereby reducing poverty worldwide 
(8 June 2005). All the same, he does not state publicly that these opportunities are not equal for all 
WTO members taking part in the multilateral negotiations.  
Policy-making in International Trade  
What instruments can Mr Mandelson use to influence the foreign policy of other governments in order 
to promote and protect Europe’s economic interests? What is his strategy to pursue these more 
effectively? He believes that, thanks to the WTO multilateral negotiations, Europe’s external trade 
policy can influence other trading partners’ decisions. He does not question the legitimacy of such 
influence, since he believes it to be granted by the WTO regulations. Accordingly, one of his top 
priorities is to develop and strengthen this international institution, since he argues that the WTO 
values are the values underpinning Europe’s prosperity (27 November 2005).  
Mandelson singles out a plausible utility function expressing the EU’s interests, and then goes on 
to identify one for each of its trading partner’s interests. Secondly, depending on the degree to which 
they differ he proposes a strategy that will make all these different functions convergent toward a Free Trade and New Economic Powers: The Worldview of Peter Mandelson 
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common equilibrium. Thirdly, as the process of negotiation/adjustment begins with each partner, a list 
of achievable outcomes becomes available. Among the plausible outcomes, Mr Mandelson attempts to 
operationalise these negotiations towards a final balance that will maximise Europe’s interests. This 
way of doing things provides an opportunity to achieve a maximum payoff given the possible 
objectives. For instance, Mandelson followed this precisely approach in order to set the EU’s objective 
for the Hong Kong meeting.  
The December 2005 Hong Kong WTO meeting represented Mandelson’s debut in multilateral 
trade negotiations for the EU. He prepared this meeting by embracing a politics of accommodation 
with the United States, and by making it very difficult to take forward any sort of negotiation with the 
developing and poorest countries, given that he put Europe’s interests far ahead of the others partners’ 
interests, leaving to one side the fact that they were less economically developed than Europe, and 
would therefore needed to be approached in a different way. Given this situation of discord, it was 
predictable even before the meeting began that little would be achieved in Hong Kong. Despite this, in 
none of his speeches prior to it did Mr Mandelson show signs of reconsidering the EU’s position nor 
did he show any disappointment about the outcomes of the preliminary negotiations. On the contrary, 
he called for a strong, positive, and aggressive European attitude for the meeting, believing that it 
would yield positive results until the very last moment. For instance, on the third day of the 
conference, 14 December 2005, he claimed, ‘We [the WTO members] have a responsibility to make 
this conference a success. I believe we can. As I have said before, Europe is here in Hong Kong to do 
business with others, if others are ready to do business with us’ (14 December 2005).  
Only a month later, during his first conference about the achievements reached in Hong Kong, he 
stated that the conference was not a ‘staggering success’. Although no negotiating partner rejected the 
EU approach, neither did they cooperate as he had expected. He pictured the Hong Kong meeting as a 
‘party that you look forward to for so long, only to find it spoiled by all your friends turning up, with 
the same present you never wanted in the first place’ (23 January 2006). He admitted that the EU’s 
trade policies were amended as a result, in order to better shape the next multilateral negotiations.  
In using this strategy, he shows us that he does not seem to identify any issues that need a short-
term decision, and that he seems instead to believe that foreign trade policy issues are a long-term 
matter, whose deadlines can be postponed almost ad infinitum depending on the cooperation of the 
actors. Mr Mandelson’s ability consists in maintaining this long-term decision making process, by 
pushing every potentially conflict situation to its limit, only conceding when it looks as if he is very 
likely to lose all credibility by forcing things any further. That is, Mandelson plays hard in order to 
convince his adversary that the EU will not back off from a position, and waiting for the opponent to 
move as closely as possible to the EU’s position. Only when the opponent no longer seems willing to 
negotiate does the EU show signs of re-considering its position. Mandelson claims that this process 
allows him to present Europe as firm and reasonable in order to also characterise its role and 
performance as firm and reasonable (Speech, 16 January 2006). In his view, this seems to be the best 
multilateral negotiations strategy to promote and defend the EU’s interests.  
This strategy includes risks. These risks are characterized by the costs of these bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, which may or may not achieve optimal outcomes for Europe. Still, according 
to Mr Mandelson, these costs are relatively limited for two rational reasons. First, in trade negotiations 
‘you get what you pay for’, i.e. in trade negotiations you experience risks only if you are willing to 
make them, and you receive what you are willing to risk (16 January 2006). Secondly, he affirms that 
most of these risks are not exclusively European but that they affect all the players in the game.  For 
instance, he believes that the failure of the Doha Round will not only damage Europe, but also the 
other countries that took part, particularly the poorest countries (21 April 2006). In his opinion, failure 
in this case means the possibility of losing the global tariff reductions, the wide removal of subsidies, 
and the strengthening of trade rules that can only be achieved through multilateral, rather than 
bilateral, negotiations (4 May 2006). Thus, since he assumes that it is these features that account for 
the increase in growth and the jobs dividend for business and citizens around the world, he believes Fiorella Triscritti 
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that the outcome of the WTO negotiations will simultaneously make all the WTO members either gain 
or lose. In other words, if the EU loses it will not be alone, and in relative terms the costs of these 
political actions will be limited.  
To summarise, in Mr Mandelson’s view, the capacity to further Europe’s interests in different ways 
and at different times increases the likeliness of obtaining an optimum equilibrium for Europe. 
Although this game is complex (it requires the accurate timing of move-making, a sound knowledge of 
opponents’ beliefs, and a realistic calculation of the risks involved), his convictions have led him to 
choose this strategy for two reasons. First, he feels that it is safe enough to play this game with other 
players that share important common interests. Second, he is convinced that open trade and 
multilateral agreements are the only solution to ensure European prosperity. Hence, Mr Mandelson’s 
approach is similar to that of a chess player: he moves, he waits for a response, and then he makes 
another move. In his approach, no coercive instruments are used to compel the adversary to move - 
neither the use of economic sanctions, nor the use of military forces. Nor are any reasons given for his 
decisions. Although these instruments do not form part of the European Commissioner’s trade 
policies, I believe that he has the power either to ask to the WTO for permission to use economic 
sanctions – as the US did for Libya, Iran, and Iraq, or, to promote such attitude within the European 
Commission. Given Mandelson’s soft-power trade policy strategy, when Europe faces a country that is 
not willing to comply with the WTO and EU’s rule, he does not have any compelling strategy to 
persuade it to do so. He seems to assume that everyone is interested in Europe and that everyone will 
fall into line with what Europe wants. This assumption can, however, be unrealistic and dangerous.  
The EU: A Successful Integration Model, and a Successful International Actor? 
Mr Mandelson has always been pro-European. He spent his political apprenticeship campaigning for a 
Europe first of six, then of nine, and of twelve members. He sees the present united Europe of 25 and 
more is a success (7 February 2006). Equally, he considers this integration model as an added value to 
integration theory. The successful enlargement of the EU is, in Mandelson’s view, the essence not 
only of a free society, but also of the EU and its economic future (7 February 2006). Secondly, the 
club has undergone a continuous expansion and whose membership is sought by everyone eligible to 
it. Finally, this integration model has an added value given the way that it has been combining and 
forging the strengths and traditions of individual countries to produce a unique new model. He argues 
that this has also produced the development of unique instruments - legislation, competition rules, 
funding programmes, monetary union - and that these render the EU a unique and capable 
intermediate player between national action and international rules (4 May 2006).  
Mr Mandelson also argues that it is the diversity of Europe that makes it stronger. He does not 
share the traditional belief of his home country about ‘the superiority of our way of doing things and 
of our political institutions’ (Speech, 2002: 162). He disagrees with those suggesting that the British 
model, given its success, should be extended as it is to the whole of Europe; he instead advocates in 
favour of a mixed European model, composed by the other members states’ policies too (Speech, 23 
November 2004). In his view, Britain cannot lead Europe alone. In fact, he tends to believe that 
Europe has worked best when a Franco-German leadership has acted together with a strong 
Commission President (Speech, 20 July 2005). As a result of this belief, he argues that the British 
leadership needs to work closely with a Franco-German partnership to improve Europe’s future. For 
this, he suggests two conditions: (i) Britain should not always claim a monopoly of virtue - that the 
Brits have got everything right and the Continentals everything wrong; (ii) if Britain argues for 
reforms, it should be from a pro-European perspective, i.e. not to cut back and limit Europe in order to 
return powers to the nation state (20 July 2005). Peter Mandelson does not deny that the EU model has 
had to face many difficulties. Firstly, due to the flagging economic performance of its member states, 
structural economic reforms have been an urgent priority. Secondly, the full potential of the single 
market has been inadequately tapped, and Europe’s historical strength in research and scientific 
leadership eroded by underinvestment. Moreover, Europe’s population is ageing fast and too many of Free Trade and New Economic Powers: The Worldview of Peter Mandelson 
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its women and over-fifties are kept out of employment (Speech, 3 February 2005). In his view, the 
future of Europe depends on solutions being provided to these issues. Mandelson argues that Europe 
cannot rest on its laurels of a successful enlargement past, but needs to focus to improve the public’s 
prosperity and living standards in order to avoid loss of popularity among its supporters (3 February 
2005).  
More generally, Mr Mandelson asks European leaders to take further action to improve the EU’s 
image. In particular, in his view Europe needs a new Social Model. He suggests that firms should be 
faster on their feet and that there is a need to reduce the existing European job protection 
arrangements. Although costly in social terms, he justifies these economic reforms through the need to 
adapt to a new language and set of priorities dictated by globalisation (Speech, 13 June 2005). 
Otherwise, he argues, the EU could not only jeopardise its credibility, and legitimacy, but also actually 
endanger its social cohesion.  
Given Mr Mandelson’s definition of power, if the EU’s size of economy weakens, then its role in 
the international relations will also weaken. At present, he does not refer to the EU as an international 
actor but as a leading actor in international relations. Thus, he views the EU as an actor whose 
influence over other countries, excepting the US, is superior to their influence over Europe. Still, he is 
aware that ‘although we are now the major player in world trade, things are changing fast thanks to the 
emergence of some developing countries’ (May 2006). In order to maintain this leading power, 
Mandelson suggests two foreign policies. First, the EU will have to take a hard-headed approach to 
ensuring that world markets are genuinely open and that international rules are applied openly and 
transparently. Secondly, Europe’s trade policy will need to account for the growth of the new 
emerging economic powers, capable of changing the international world equilibria. Mandelson’s 
answer to the emerging economic powers is clear. Europe should not consider them as a threat only, 
but should build strategic partnerships with them. This, he argues, is in the best interests of Europe and 
of the international economic order. As Mandelson’s visits outside European countries show, so far 
during his mandate he has mainly visited China and India. In a nutshell, he believes that the EU needs 
to signal both to Europeans and populations across the globe that they are important for the EU if it 
wishes to maintain its role as leading actor.  
To summarise, Mandelson’s beliefs about the EU’s self-image and as an international actor are 
significantly correlated. He argues that the lack of a communitarian image of Europe hinders both the 
process of European integration and its role as an international actor across the globe. For instance, Mr 
Mandelson believes that the suspension of the Constitutional Treaty was not due to its institutional 
proposal, but because there is no consensus about what Europe is for and where it is going to (13 June 
2005). Accordingly, since the role of the European bodies is not perceived in the same way by all 
member states, their capacity to represent member states’ interests at international level is limited. 
With respect to external trade policies, Mr Mandelson argues that only if all member states cease to 
consider the Commission as the twenty-sixth member state, will this body have the capacity to lead 
their trade interests at the international level (21 July 2005). Just as the absence of consensus was 
perceived as a challenge in Mr Mandelson’s understanding of international relations, so it is also a 
challenge endangering the self-image of Europe and its power as an international actor.   
Conclusion: The Future of Europe 
Since October 2004, Peter Mandelson has constructed an image of himself that represents his belief 
systems as Europe’s Trade Commissioner. Firstly, he recalls his experience in Africa to show how 
life-committed he is to eradicating poverty worldwide. Secondly, he recalls his experience as 
Hartlepool MP to signal that he has been capable of dealing with the challenges of globalisation. In his 
view, this image portrays him as a successful EU Commissioner, capable of defending the EU’s 
interests worldwide, and of fighting global challenges such as poverty.  Fiorella Triscritti 
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In order to accomplish these missions, his approach promotes open trade and a less regulated 
market. In his view, it is open trade which engenders sustainable development, creates jobs, and 
ultimately fights poverty. He argues that the combination of open trade and development policies can 
help face the challenges imposed by globalisation, as well as to defend Europe’s trade interests. 
Although he is aware of the difficult adjusting process that each member state is experiencing, due to 
the challenges imposed by globalisation, he vigorously suggests not being fearful but of opening up 
European countries’ economies. As one of the fathers of the New Labour British party ideology, his 
trade policy affirms that liberalisation means gains for Europe in the post-Cold War era. Protection is 
costly and an ineffective means of sustaining employment, since it insulates inefficient sectors from 
competition. He believes that there are no rich closed economies. 
This neo-liberal approach favours the activities of multilateral international organisations or treaty 
devices such as the WTO. In his view, the WTO structure allows all its members to equally benefit 
from global trade given that they all participate in the democratic multilateral negotiations. He argues 
that the WTO’s goal is to help all producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers to conduct 
their business. Also, he argues that this institution is not perfect since it needs to increase its 
transparency and ways to participate in decision-making; yet he is convinced that the key to Europe’s 
prosperity and the eradication of poverty is conditioned by the success, or lack of it, of the WTO 
Round negotiations.  
Accordingly, Europe’s role in this international order is to enforce multilateral negotiations. In his 
view, this is fundamental for Europe’s future. He argues that the Commission, and himself, are 
capable of representing and defending all the member states’ interests during multilateral negotiations. 
The more the member states manage to find a consensus about the self-image of Europe and its role as 
international actor, the better he and the other Commissioners will be able to represent them. Mr 
Mandelson also urges the member states to understand that in order to be a powerful international 
actor, Europe needs to find more profitable solutions to cope with the challenges of globalisation. At 
this point in history he believes that the WTO negotiations are the right way to help Europe in this 
task. He thus believes that the success of the Doha Round could be the WTO’s biggest prize for 
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